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The Home Affordable Modification Program: The 
Federal Circuit Court Split Leaves Mortgagors’ Rights 
to Pursue State Law Claims Unclear 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
For most people, the American Dream includes home 
ownership. Due to the recent financial crisis, many Americans have 
found it much harder to achieve this goal. With home foreclosures on 
the rise and many Americans struggling to pay their mortgages, the 
federal government created the Home Affordable Modification Program 
(“HAMP”) in 2009 to slow foreclosures and help keep Americans in 
their homes.1 Unfortunately, problems with interpretation and 
implementation of HAMP have led to a significant amount of  
litigation.2 
One of the interpretative issues in HAMP is whether mortgagors 
should be permitted to bring state law claims against lenders and loan 
servicers for actions relating to HAMP, a federal program. Circuits are 
currently split on this issue, as some courts have held that  HAMP 
creates no private cause of action and therefore precludes state law 
claims.3 Other courts have allowed state law claims arising under facts 
related to HAMP.4 This Note argues that mortgagors should be 
permitted to bring certain state law claims in relation to HAMP because 
doing so would help ensure that mortgage servicers comply with HAMP 
directives and that mortgagors are protected against deceptive practices 
in connection with HAMP modifications. 
This Note proceeds in four parts. Part II explains why HAMP 
 
1. Andrew Hawes, Forcing Lenders to Comply with the Home Affordable 
Modification Program, 101 ILL. B.J. 308, 309 (2013). 
2. Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 673 F.3d 547, 559–60 n.4 (7th Cir. 2012) 
(noting that the court had analyzed over eighty federal court cases where  mortgagors 
brought HAMP-related claims against their mortgage servicers). 
3. See id. at 555 (holding that although the allegation arose from action relating to 
HAMP, mortgagors were not barred from bringing adequately pled state law claims). 
4. See Miller v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, 677 F.3d 1113 (11th Cir. 2012) (holding that 
mortgagors were barred from bringing claims because the claims were based on alleged 
breaches of HAMP, a federal program which afford no private right of action). 
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was instituted and the process it sets forth for a mortgagor to obtain a 
permanent modification of a home mortgage.5 Part III discusses the 
different approaches federal circuit courts have taken in analyzing 
whether HAMP precludes state law claims.6 Part IV discusses why 
circuit courts allowing state law claims relating to HAMP set a better 
precedent for mortgagors seeking to enforce their servicer’s HAMP 
obligations.7 Part V concludes by discussing the ramifications of 
precluding state law claims and briefly recounts the claims that have 
been successfully asserted in federal courts.8 
II. CREATION OF THE HOME AFFORDABLE MODIFICATION PROGRAM AND 
THE MODIFICATION PROCESS 
 
 
A. Purpose and Participation by Loan Servicers in HAMP 
 
In response to the 2008 financial crisis, Congress enacted the 
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (“EESA”),9 which empowered 
the Secretary of the Treasury (the “Treasury”) to establish certain 
programs “to restore liquidity and stability” in the U.S. financial 
system.10 A major portion of EESA included the Troubled Asset Relief 
Program (“TARP”), which gave the Treasury authority to inject capital 
into financial institutions by purchasing preferred stock in them, and to 
implement a plan to help financially distressed homeowners and 
minimize foreclosures.11 As part of this effort, the Treasury instituted 
HAMP in 2009 to help struggling mortgagors and slow down the pace  
of foreclosures.12 HAMP attempts to incentivize mortgage servicers to 
offer aid to troubled mortgagors by refinancing mortgages with more 
favorable  interest  rates and  lower  monthly payments.13     The Treasury 
 
5. See infra Part II. 
6. See infra Part III. 
7. See infra Part IV. 
8. See infra Part V. 
9. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA), Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 
Stat. 3765 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 and 26 U.S.C.). 
10.    EESA § 2, 12 U.S.C. § 5201 (2012). 
11. EESA §§ 3(9), 101(a), 12 U.S.C. § 5202(9), 5211(a); Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) § 1482, 12 U.S.C. § 5219a (2012). 
12.    EESA § 109, 12 U.S.C. § 5219(a). 
13. Federally sponsored entities Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are required to 
participate in HAMP.   MAKING  HOME  AFFORDABLE  PROGRAM: HANDBOOK FOR SERVICERS 
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set aside $50 billion to pay mortgage servicers who completed 
modifications under HAMP.14 Of these funds, the Treasury has only  
paid out $2.5 billion through September 2014.15 
Loan servicers participate in HAMP through written Service 
Participation Agreements (“SPAs”) with the Treasury.16 The terms of 
these SPAs require participating servicers to identify potentially eligible 
first lien mortgages for possible modification in an effort to make loan 
payments more affordable through “interest rate reduction, term 
extension, principal forbearance, and principal forgiveness.”17 The 
participating mortgage servicers receive between $800 and $2,000 from 
the Treasury for every permanent modification entered into, as well as 
other incentives.18 
 
B. Mortgagor Requirements for HAMP Eligibility 
 
A mortgagor is eligible for HAMP if he meets certain basic 
requirements detailed in the HAMP guidelines.19 To be eligible for 
HAMP, the following requirements must be met: (1) the mortgage loan 
must be a first lien mortgage originated on or before January 1, 2009;20 
(2) the mortgagor must be able to show documented financial hardship 
and that he does not have sufficient liquid assets to make the current 
monthly mortgage payments;21 (3) the current unpaid principal balance 
must be below the program limit of $729,750 for a single family 
home;22 (4) the mortgagor must have submitted an Initial Package 
requesting a modification on or before December 31, 2015; (5) and the 
 
 
 
OF NON-GSE MORTGAGES 13 (Ver. 4.4, March 3, 2014) [hereinafter HAMP HANDBOOK], 
available at 
https://www.hmpadmin.com/portal/programs/docs/hamp_servicer/mhahandbook_41.pdf 
14. Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 673 F.3d 547, 556 (7th Cir. 2012). 
15. SPEC. INSPECT. GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM, QUARTERLY 
REPORT TO CONGRESS 431         (Oct.         29,         2014),      available        at 
http://www.sigtarp.gov/Quarterly%20Reports/October_29_2014_Report_to_Congress.pdf. 
16. HAMP HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 23. 
17. Id. at 15. 
18. Id. at 144. Other monetary incentives are detailed in the HAMP Handbook. Id. at 
143–45. 
19. Id. at 72. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. 
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Modification Effective Date is on or before September 30, 2016.23 
In addition to these requirements, default on the mortgage must 
be reasonably foreseeable, the mortgage must be delinquent, or the 
mortgage must be in foreclosure.24 Regardless of the status,  the 
mortgage must be secured by a single family property which is occupied 
by the mortgagor as his primary place of residence.25 Furthermore, the 
mortgagor’s monthly payment prior to the modification must have been 
more than 31% of his verified gross monthly income.26 Finally, the loan 
must not have been previously modified through the HAMP program.27 
 
C. The HAMP Modification Process 
 
If a mortgagor meets the program requirements, the loan 
servicer will calculate a modification payment amount using a 
“waterfall” approach.28 This approach requires the loan  servicer  to 
apply changes to the repayment requirements in a specific order until  
the modified payment is as close as possible to 31% of the mortgagor’s 
gross monthly income.29 To reach this 31%, first the loan is capitalized; 
second, the interest rate is reduced; third, the loan term is extended; and 
fourth, if necessary, the loan is placed into principal forbearance.30 
Once a loan has met the threshold requirements and a modified 
payment amount has been determined through the waterfall method, the 
loan servicer will perform a net present value (“NPV”) test.31 This test 
compares the NPV of the mortgage to the NPV of the same mortgage if 
it were modified under HAMP.32 If the NPV with a modification is 
greater  than  the  NPV  without  a  modification,  the  result  is  deemed 
 
 
23. The Initial Package is the required forms that must be sent to the loan servicers,  
and includes: a Request for Mortgage Assistance form; IRS form 4506-T or 4506T-EZ or 
the mortgagor’s most recent tax return; evidence of income; and Dodd-Frank certification. 
Id. at 83. 
24. Id. at 74. 
25. Id. at 73. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. 
28.    Id. at 111. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. at 111–12. Capitalization is the addition of accrued interest and other advances 
to the principal of the loan. Id. Principal forbearance is a deferral of a portion  of the 
principal until the end of loan. Id. 
31.    Id. at 122. 
32. Id. 
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“positive.”33 Conversely, if the NPV with a modification is less than the 
NPV without a modification, the result is deemed “negative.”34 A loan 
that has a positive NPV must be offered a Trial Plan Period (“TPP”).35  
A loan that has a negative NPV is not required to be offered TPP, but 
the lender may elect to do so.36 
If a mortgagor is offered a TPP, it must last a minimum of three 
months.37  Additionally, the new monthly payment must be set at 31%  
of the mortgagor’s gross monthly income derived through the waterfall 
method.38 Borrowers who make all TPP payments on time and meet all 
other requirements “will be offered a permanent modification.”39 
The process described above applies to Tier 1 HAMP 
modifications.40  In 2012, HAMP was expanded to include loans that   
did not qualify under Tier 1, and Tier 2 HAMP modifications were 
created.41 The Tier 2 modification process is practically identical to that 
of Tier 1, but extends modifications to a greater number of mortgages 
previously ineligible for HAMP.42 All loans and  modifications 
discussed in this Note relate to Tier 1 HAMP Modifications.43 
III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER STATE LAW CLAIMS RELATING TO HAMP 
 
All the federal courts agree that HAMP does not create a private 
right of action under federal law, and no claim can be made for 
violations of HAMP.44    Federal courts split, however, on whether state 
 
 
 
33. Id. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. 
37.    Id. at 126. 
38.    Id. at 127. 
39. Id. at 126. The HAMP Handbook uses the language “will be offered a permanent 
modification,” and this wording is the source of much of the litigation. Id. 
40.    Id. at 72–126. 
41.    Id. at 73 n.2. 
42. See id. at 73. Tier 2 modifications apply to a broader range of  mortgages,  
including rental properties and loans that have previously been in HAMP, but fell out of 
good standing. Id. 
43. See infra Part III. 
44. See Miller v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, 677 F.3d 1113, 1116 (11th Cir. 2012) (stating 
that HAMP does not create a private right of action); Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 673 
F.3d 547, 555 (7th Cir. 2012) (stating that HAMP and its enabling statute do not contain a 
federal right of action). 
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law claims are thereby precluded.45 
A. Federal Courts Finding State Law Claims Relating to HAMP 
Precluded 
 
The United States Courts of Appeals for the Eleventh and Fifth 
Circuits have held that because HAMP does not create a private right of 
action under federal law, mortgagors are barred from bringing claims 
against lenders for violations relating to HAMP under state law.46 
In Miller v. Chase Home Finance, LLC,47 the Eleventh Circuit 
rejected the mortgagor’s state law claims.48 The mortgagor, Miller, 
requested a loan modification pursuant to HAMP and the lender, Chase, 
agreed to a temporary modification of the loan.49 After going through  
the HAMP process and successfully completing the TPP, Chase 
informed Miller that it would not extend a permanent modification.50 
After Miller received this notification, he filed suit against Chase for 
failure to comply with its obligation under HAMP.51 Miller brought suit 
“for (1) breach of contract, (2) breach of the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing, and (3) promissory estoppel.”52 He filed suit in 
federal court based on diversity of citizenship and amount in 
controversy pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.53 
In rejecting the state law claims pled in Miller, the Eleventh 
Circuit held that there was no private right of action under HAMP.54 
Although the court acknowledged that there is no express private right  
of action, it stated that the court had never analyzed whether an  implied 
 
45. See Miller, 677 F.3d at 1117 (rejecting state law claims because they are premised 
on obligations under HAMP). But see Wigod, 673 F.3d at 555 (establishing that although 
HAMP does not create a private right of action, it does not preempt viable state law claims). 
46. See Miller, 677 F.3d at 1117 (holding that state law claims are based on—and not 
independent of—HAMP, which affords no private right of action); see also Opinion and 
Order at 8, Vida v. OneWest Bank, F.S.B., Civ. 10-987-AC, 2010 WL 5148473, at *5 (D. 
Or. Dec. 13, 2010) (holding state law claims are too closely tied to HAMP to be  
independent of HAMP which affords no private right of action). 
47.    677 F.3d 1113 (11th Cir. 2012). 
48.    Id. at 1117 (holding that state law claims may not be brought). 
49.    Id. at 1115. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. 
53. Complaint at 2, Miller v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, No. 2:10-CV-0206 (N.D. Ga. 
Oct. 6, 2011). 
54. Miller v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, 677 F.3d 1113, 1116 (11th Cir. 2012). 
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private right of action existed.55 In concluding that there is no such 
implied right under HAMP, the court applied the “implied private right 
of action test.”56 This test examines four factors: (1) whether  the 
plaintiff is a member of the class for whose especial benefit the law was 
created; (2) whether there is legislative intent to create or deny a 
remedy; (3) whether a private right of action is consistent with the 
purpose for enacting the law; and (4) whether the right of action is 
traditionally one of state law, and therefore improper to infer a private 
right of action due to the federal law.57 The court found  that  HAMP 
was enacted not for the benefit of mortgagors, but to allow the Treasury 
to stabilize the financial markets.58 The court also noted that it found no 
legislative intent to create any private right of action.59 Next, the court 
stated that allowing mortgagors to bring these claims would conflict 
with the HAMP’s purpose, which is to incentivize mortgage servicers to 
modify distressed mortgages.60 Finally, the  court  noted  that contract 
and property law are traditionally areas of law left to the states.61 
Having found that no private right of action exists under HAMP, 
the court held that Miller lacked standing to bring state law claims 
arising from his mortgage servicer’s obligations under HAMP.62 
Accordingly, because all of Miller’s claims were based on violations of 
his servicer’s HAMP obligations, the court dismissed them.63 
The Fifth Circuit rejected similar HAMP claims on different 
grounds.64 In Pennington v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A.,65 the Fifth Circuit 
rejected the theory that a TPP creates a contract under which state law 
claims may be brought.66    The Fifth Circuit acknowledged the approach 
 
55. Id. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. (citing Hemispherx Biopharma, Inc. v. Johannesburg Consol. Invs., 553 F.3d 
1351, 1362 n.14 (11th Cir. 2008)). 
58. Id. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. 
62.    Id. at 1116–17. 
63. See id. at 1117. Interestingly, the court analyzed the sufficiency of Miller’s claims 
under state law and determined that they would still be dismissed even if HAMP provided 
Miller with adequate standing. Id. 
64. See Pennington v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 493 F. App’x 548 (5th Cir. 2012), cert. 
denied, 133 U.S. 1272 (2013). 
65.    Id. at 551–53. 
66. See id. at 553–55 (holding that no contract exists because the mortgage servicer 
expresses no intent to be bound until a permanent modification is signed). 
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taken in Miller, but opted to go a different route, stating that the TPP is 
not a contract because the bank expressed no intent to be bound by it.67 
On this rationale, the court dismissed the claims for breach of contract  
of both the TPP and the Modification Agreement.68 The court also 
dismissed the remaining claims for insufficient pleadings.69 
 
B. Federal Courts Allowing State Law Claims Related to HAMP 
 
In contrast to the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, the Seventh,  
Ninth, First, and Fourth Circuits have allowed certain adequately pled 
state law claims to proceed, even though they are based on actions 
arising under HAMP.70 
In Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,71 the Seventh Circuit 
allowed some of the mortgagor’s state law claims to proceed.72 In 2009, 
the mortgager, Wigod, was in financial distress and unable to pay her 
current mortgage payment.73 Wigod requested a modification pursuant  
to HAMP and submitted all the proper paperwork.74 The lender, Wells 
Fargo, determined that Wigod was eligible for a HAMP modification 
and began a TPP for her loan.75 Wigod complied with her obligations 
under the TPP and made all the requisite payments,76 but upon 
completion of the TPP, Wells Fargo refused to offer Wigod a permanent 
modification.77 Wigod filed suit against Wells Fargo, alleging state law 
claims including breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and violations 
of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act 
 
 
67. See id. (rejecting the position that the TPP constitutes a contract, the Fifth Circuit 
declined to follow the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Wigod). 
68. See id. 
69. See id. at 556–57 (dismissing claims for negligent misrepresentation  and 
promissory estoppel for failure to plead a claim for which relief can be granted). 
70. See, e.g., Young v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 717 F.3d 224, 235 (1st Cir. 2013) 
(holding that plaintiff had adequately pled a breach of contract claim from facts  arising 
under HAMP); Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 673 F.3d 547, 559–60 n.4 (7th Cir. 2012) 
(holding that federal law does not preclude adequately pled state law claims from being 
brought even if the claims are based on actions arising under HAMP, which does not  
provide a private cause of action). 
71.    673 F.3d 547. 
72.    Id. at 559 n.4. 
73.    Id. at 557–58. 
74.    Id. at 558. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. 
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(“ICFA”).78 
The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that HAMP and its enabling 
statute did not create a private right of action, but concluded that this  
did not bar mortgagors from bringing adequately pled state law claims 
against mortgage servicers for actions relating to HAMP.79 In reaching 
this conclusion, the Wigod court reviewed over eighty federal cases 
where mortgagors attempted to bring claims against their mortgage 
servicers for actions relating to HAMP.80 The court identified  three  
legal theories attempted by plaintiffs in these actions.81 The first theory 
was to bring claims arising under HAMP and its enabling statutes.82 
However, the Wigod court found that this private right of action theory 
had been universally rejected by all other federal courts.83 The second 
theory attempted to claim that mortgagors were third-party beneficiaries 
of the SPAs negotiated between the mortgage servicers and the 
Treasury.84 The court noted that the vast majority of courts that 
considered this claim had rejected it, finding that the mortgagors were 
not intended beneficiaries of the SPAs.85 The third theory based the 
claims on the TPP agreements between the mortgagors and the  
mortgage servicers.86 This theory has been used by some  courts to  
allow mortgagors to bring contract claims, tort claims, and consumer 
fraud statute violations against their mortgage servicers by basing these 
claims directly on the TPP agreements.87 The TPP agreements place the 
mortgagors in direct privity with their mortgage servicers, eliminating 
the third party issue that caused the second theory to fail.88 
Accepting the TPP claim based theory, the court then analyzed 
each of Wigod’s  state law  claims and  found  that she  had   adequately 
 
78. Id. at 555.   Wigod attempted to bring her case as a class action pursuant to 28 
U.S.C.A. § 1332(d)(2) (West 2013), but the district court noted she had diversity of 
citizenship pursuant to § 1332(a), and it opted not to delve into the class action issue.  
Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 10-CV-2348, 2011 WL 250501, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 
25, 2011). 
79.    Wigod, 673 F.3d at 559. 
80.    Id. at 559–60 n.4. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. 
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pled breach of contract, promissory estoppel, fraudulent 
misrepresentations, and violations of ICFA claims.89 Once  it  
determined that certain state law claims had been adequately pled, the 
court analyzed whether these claims were preempted by federal law.90 
The court determined that no theory of preemption prevented 
mortgagors from bringing adequately pled state law claims against 
mortgagor servicers for actions relating to HAMP.91  Express  
preemption was conceded by the parties, so the court did not analyze the 
topic.92 In rejecting field preemption, the court disagreed with Wells 
Fargo’s claim that the Home Owners’ Loan Act93 (“HOLA”) occupied 
the relevant field.94 The court rejected this theory based on its 
interpretation of the relevant statutes and precedent.95 The court also 
rejected Wells Fargo’s claims of conflict preemption based on the 
argument that allowing state law claims would be an obstacle to Wells 
Fargo’s participation in HAMP.96 The court  rejected this claim based  
on precedent, the fact that Congress did not intend to foreclose all suits 
against mortgage servicers, and the fact that the HAMP guidelines 
require that HAMP be implemented in compliance with state law.97 
After clarifying that state law claims are not preempted, the 
court addressed what it called the “end-run” theory.98 Wells Fargo 
argued that Wigod’s claims were simply “HAMP claims in disguise,”99 
and were an attempt to dodge the fact that HAMP did not provide for a 
private cause of action.100  The court found no support for this claim,  
and stated that it is remarkably similar to conflict preemption.101 The 
court also cited cases in which a federal statute that provides no right of 
 
 
89. Id. at 560–74 (rejecting claims of negligent hiring or supervision, negligent 
misrepresentations and concealment, and fraudulent concealment). 
90.    Id. at 576. 
91.   Id. at 576–81; see infra notes 136–54 and accompanying text. 
92.    Wigod, 673 F.3d at 576. 
93.    Home Owners’ Loan Act (HOLA), ch. 64, 124 Stat. 128 (1933). 
94.    Id. at 576–77. 
95. Id. (citing In re Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC Mortg. Servicing Litig., 491 F.3d 638 
(7th Cir. 2007)). 
96.    Id. at 577–78. 
97. See id. at 577–81 (holding that conflict preemption was inconsistent  with  the 
Seventh Circuit’s opinion in In re Ocwen Loan Servicing) 
98.    Id. at 581. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. 
101.    Id. at 581–85. 
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action does not preclude state law claims.102 
In Corvello v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,103 the Ninth Circuit 
extended the reasoning in Wigod when it held that mortgage servicers 
are contractually required to offer a permanent modification to 
mortgagors who successfully complete a TPP.104 Like Wigod, Corvello 
was a financially distressed mortgagor who sought a modification 
pursuant to HAMP and entered into a TPP with his servicer, Wells 
Fargo, but upon successful completion, was not offered a permanent 
modification.105 Based on diversity of citizenship, Corvello filed claims 
in federal court for breach of contract, “promissory estoppel, breaches  
of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and violations of 
California’s Unfair Competition Law.”106 Similar to the ruling in  
Wigod, the Ninth Circuit held that the TPP creates a contract under 
which state law claims could be brought.107 Corvello extended the 
reasoning in Wigod to find a contractual relationship even if the servicer 
did not receive a signed copy of the TPP, as was the case in Wigod.108 
The First Circuit allowed state law claims in relation to HAMP 
in Young v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.109 Young’s facts are very similar to 
other HAMP-related cases.110 Young, the mortgagor, was financially 
distressed and applied for a HAMP modification.111 After successfully 
completing the TPP, Young was not offered a permanent 
modification.112 Young filed suit in Massachusetts  state  court  and 
Wells Fargo removed the case to the United States District Court for the 
District of Massachusetts.113 In her complaint, Young alleged breach of 
contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, negligent 
and   intentional   infliction   of   emotional   distress,   and   unfair  debt 
 
 
102.    Id. at 581 (citing Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431 (2005)). 
103.    728 F.3d 878 (9th Cir. 2013). 
104.    Id. at 880. 
105.    Id. at 884. 
106.    Id. at 882. 
107.    Id. at 884. 
108.   Id. 
109.    717 F.3d 224 (1st Cir. 2013). 
110. See, e.g., Miller v. Chase Home Fin. LLC, 677 F.3d 1113, 1115–117 (11th Cir. 
2012); Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 673 F.3d 547, 557–59 (7th Cir. 2012). 
111.    Young, 717 F.3d at 230. 
112. Id. 
113. Notice of Removal at 1, Young v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 1:11-CV-10757, 
2011 WL 7943923 (D. Mass. May 2, 2011). 
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collection practices in violation of Massachusetts state law.114 The First 
Circuit allowed the claims for breach of contract and unfair debt 
collection practices to proceed.115 
The court in Young did not specifically address whether 
HAMP’s lack of a private right of action bars state law claims.116 The 
court addressed each of Young’s claims and determined she adequately 
pled a claim for breach of contract and unfair debt collection practices  
in violation of Massachusetts law.117 Although the court  never  
addressed the issue of whether HAMP precluded state law claims, it 
allowed a breach of contract claim based on the TPP, an integral part of 
the HAMP modification process.118 
The Fourth Circuit may be open to following  Wigod’s path.119  
In Spaulding v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,120 the Fourth Circuit noted that 
state law claims related to HAMP are not necessarily precluded simply 
because HAMP creates no private right of action.121 The  Spaulding 
court dismissed all the claims, but based its dismissal on the fact that the 
mortgagors had never entered into a TPP agreement with their mortgage 
servicer.122 
When courts have allowed state law claims for actions relating 
to HAMP, they generally fall under contract claims, alternative contract 
theories such as promissory estoppel, and consumer fraud protection 
laws.123 These courts base the breach of contract claims on the theory 
that  the  TPP  agreement  between  the  mortgagor  and  the  mortgage 
 
114.    Young, 717 F.3d at 228. 
115.    Id. at 242. 
116. See id. at 236 n.10 (stating that the district court dismissed Count II because  
HAMP provides no private right of action, and since Young does not challenge that ruling, 
the First Circuit will not pass on the merits). 
117. See id. at 236, 242 (holding that Young adequately pled a violation of MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ch. 93A (2014), which provides a cause of action for those injured by unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices). 
118.    Id. at 235–36. 
119. See Spaulding v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A., 714 F.3d 769, 776–77 n.4 (4th Cir. 2013) 
(citing Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 673 F.3d 547, 581 (7th Cir. 2012) (“The absence 
of a private right of action from a federal statute provides no reason to dismiss a claim under 
a state law just because it refers to or incorporates some element of the federal law.”). 
120.    714 F.3d 769. 
121.    Id. at 776–77 n.4 (citing Wigod, 673 F.3d at 581). 
122.    Id. at 775. 
123. See Wigod, 673 F.3d at 559–60 n.4 (allowing claims for breach of contract, 
promissory estoppel, and the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices 
Act); see also Young, 717 F.3d at 235 (holding that plaintiff had adequately pled a breach of 
contract claim and MASS. GEN. LAW ch. 93A). 
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servicer created a contract.124 The consumer protection law claim in 
Wigod was based solely on actions relating to the  TPP.125  Young 
allowed a similar claim on actions based on the TPP, but the claim also 
involved certain actions of Wells Fargo that extended beyond the TPP  
to actions related to notices that she was in arrears and a forbearance 
agreement that occurred over a year before she began the HAMP 
process.126 
 
C. Federal Courts That Have Side-stepped the HAMP Issue 
 
In Cox v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.,127 the 
Eighth Circuit declined to address whether HAMP’s failure to provide a 
private cause of action precluded adequately pled state law claims.128 
This case arose when the mortgagor, Cox, found himself in financial 
distress and attempted to modify his mortgage payment through 
HAMP.129  After successfully completing the TPP, Cox was not offered 
a permanent modification.130  Cox filed suit in Minnesota state court,  
and Mortgage Electronic Registration Services removed it to the United 
States District Court for the District of Minnesota based on diversity of 
citizenship pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.131 Cox alleged certain state 
law claims, and the district court dismissed all the claims due to the fact 
that “HAMP creates no private right of action” and the claims were 
premised on HAMP obligations.132 In the alternative, the district court 
would have dismissed the claims for failure to state a claim.133 
In its review of the district court decision, the Eighth Circuit 
noted that it would not address the issue of whether HAMP precluded 
adequately pled  state law  claims because  Cox had not  adequately pled 
 
 
124.    Wigod, 673 F.3d at 559–60 n.4; Young, 717 F.3d at 235. 
125.    Wigod, 673 F.3d at 574–76. 
126.    Young, 717 F.3d at 240–42. 
127.    685 F.3d 663 (8th Cir. 2012). 
128.    Id. at 675 n.4. 
129.    Id. at 667. 
130. Id. 
131. Notice of Removal at 2, Cox v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 794 F. Supp. 
2d 1060 (D. Minn. 2010) (No. 0:10-CV-04626). 
132.    Cox, 685 F.3d at 667–68. 
133. Id. at 668 (noting that the district court held in the alternative that Cox had not met 
the federal pleading standard for his claims under Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 
544 (2007)). 
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his state law claims.134 The Eighth Circuit upheld the dismissal of all 
Cox’s state law claims for reasons independent of their connection to 
HAMP, purposefully declining to decide the issue.135 
IV. MORTGAGORS’ STATE LAW CLAIMS RELATING TO HAMP SHOULD 
BE PERMITTED 
 
 
A. HAMP Should Not Preempt Adequately Pled State Law Claims 
 
State law claims relating to HAMP have raised preemption 
concerns.136 The Constitution provides that federal law has supremacy 
over state law.137 In order for federal law to preempt state law, 
preemption must be the “clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”138 
Preemption occurs in one of three ways: (1) express preemption, (2) 
field preemption, or (3) conflict preemption.139 
Express preemption occurs when a federal law expressly states 
that the particular federal statute trumps state and local laws.140  
Nowhere in the HAMP enabling statute is there a clear statement of 
preemption over state laws, and therefore no express preemption 
exists.141 The lack of express preemption is so  prominent  that  the 
Wigod court barely touched on the topic in its detailed preemption 
analysis.142 
 
 
134.    Id. at 675 n.4. 
135. See id. (dismissing all the claims for failure to sufficiently plead “sufficient factual 
matter accepted as true, to state a plausible claim on its face.”) The court dismissed Count I 
requesting an accounting of the lender’s activities in relation to the loan stating that if any 
other claim was viable, discovery would be adequate to make the sought after information 
available. Id.  The court dismissed Count II pertaining to the fairness of a lender purchasing 
a home it foreclosed on because the complaint did not make allegations in relation to the 
sale. Id. They further dismissed the count for breach of the duty of good faith and fair 
dealing because the mortgagor did not plead sufficient facts for such a claim. Id. The court 
also dismissed claims of misrepresentation because the mortgagor did not plead reliance, a 
necessary element. Id. 
136. See Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 673 F.3d 547, 576–81 (7th Cir. 2012) 
(analyzing whether HAMP preempts state law claims). 
137. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
138.   Wigod, 673 F.3d at 576 (quoting Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009)). 
139. Arsen Sarapinian, Fighting Foreclosure: Using Contract Law to Enforce the Home 
Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), 64 Hastings L.J. 905, 921 (2013). 
140. Id. (citing FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 56–57 (1990)). 
141. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 5201, 5219(a) (2012); see HAMP HANDBOOK, supra note 13. 
142.    Wigod, 673 F.3d at 576–77. 
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Field preemption occurs when “federal law so thoroughly 
occupies a legislative field ‘as to make reasonable the inference that 
Congress left no room for the States to supplement it.’ ”143 Field 
preemption should not apply to state law claims implicating actions 
related to HAMP because HAMP does not apply to all home 
modifications, but only those that meet HAMP’s strict requirements.144 
Loan modifications occurred before HAMP was enacted, and the 
HAMP guidelines do not cover every mortgagor that seeks  
modification. This should eliminate the possibility of field preemption 
precluding state law claims relating to HAMP. The court in Wigod 
reached the same conclusion, and rejected Wells Fargo’s argument that 
HOLA and the Office of Thrift Supervision (“OTS”) regulations occupy 
the relevant field.145 In doing so, the court pointed to a provision of the 
OTS regulations that explains certain state law claims, including 
contract claims, are not preempted if they only have incidental effects  
on lending operations.146 The court also noted that the position taken by 
Wells Fargo is in direct conflict with the precedent set by the Seventh 
Circuit.147 In In re Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC Mortg. Servicing 
Litig.,148 the Seventh Circuit held that HOLA did not create a private 
right of action, but this did not preempt state common law claims by 
those harmed by wrongful acts of their savings and loan associations.149 
Conflict preemption occurs when “(1) ‘it is impossible for a 
private party to comply with both state and federal requirements,’ or (2) 
‘where state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and 
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’ ”150    The 
 
143. Id. at 576 (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992)). 
144. HAMP HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 68 (describing the requirements that must be 
met to qualify for a HAMP modification). 
145. Wigod, 673 F.3d at 576–77. Wells Fargo attempted to rely on HOLA, a statute 
enacted to provide relief from the massive amount of home loan defaults during the Great 
Depression. Id. (citing Home Owners’ Loan Act (HOLA), ch. 64, §§ 4(a), 5(a), 124 Stat. 
128, 129, 132 (1933) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 1463(a), 1464(a) (West 
2013)).   HOLA gave the OTS authority to create and regulate savings associations.   HOLA 
§§4(a), 5(a), 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 1463(a), 1464(a). Wells Fargo attempted to rely on OTS 
regulation that stated it “occupies the entire field of federal regulation for federal savings 
associations.”  Wigod, 673 F.3d at 576–77. (citing 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(a) (2014)). 
146.    Wigod, 673 F.3d at 577. 
147.  Id. (citing In re Ocwen  Loan Servicing, LLC Mortg. Servicing Litig., 491 F.3d   
638, 643 (7th Cir. 2007)). 
148.    491 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2007). 
149.    Id. at 643. 
150.   Wigod, 673 F.3d at 578 (quoting Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287 
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HAMP guidelines state that implementation of the  program  by 
mortgage servicers must be in compliance with all laws, including state 
laws.151 This provision contradicts the idea that HAMP preempts state 
law claims because of a conflict.152 Compliance with state law would 
include statutes and common law and leads to the conclusion that if 
these laws are violated, the courts may provide a remedy.153 In Wigod, 
Wells Fargo unsuccessfully argued that state law claims presented an 
obstacle to their accomplishment and execution of HAMP.154 
Allowing state law claims would not conflict with the 
implementation of HAMP, but rather ensure loan servicers compliance 
with the program. The HAMP guidelines lay out detailed steps loan 
servicers must follow in the modification process.155 State law claims 
would only be brought if a mortgagor believes his loan servicer has 
violated the servicer’s HAMP obligations, further ensuring compliance, 
not creating an obstacle to HAMP implementation. Wigod reached the 
same conclusion, and rejected this argument because it contradicted the 
precedent set in In re Ocwen that state common law claims are 
complementary to HOLA.156 
Furthermore, allowing state law claims would not contradict the 
Congress’ purpose in enacting HAMP.157 Allowing such claims would 
not impose additional duties on mortgage servicers, it would not open 
mortgage servicers to multiple standards of conduct, nor would it 
conflict with the intent of Congress.158 Wigod acknowledged that 
allowing state claims may decrease servicer participation in HAMP.159 
Servicer participation in HAMP was almost certainly a goal  of 
Congress, but another goal was to prevent banks from taking advantage 
of mortgagors in financial difficulty.160 Nothing in HAMP leads to the 
conclusion that servicer participation should be more important than 
 
 
(1995)). 
151.    Id. at 581. 
152.   Id. 
153.    Id. at 580. 
154.    Id. at 578. 
155. HAMP HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 104–18. 
156. In re Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC Mortg. Servicing Litig., 491 F.3d 638, 643 (7th 
Cir. 2007). 
157.    Wigod, 673 F.3d at 579–81. 
158.   Id. 
159.    Id. at 580. 
160.    Id. at 581. 
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servicer compliance with their obligations under HAMP.161 
Nevertheless, federal courts are still reluctant to allow state law 
claims in relation to HAMP due to preemption issues.162   However, the 
preemption doctrine is not implicated in these cases because these state 
common law claims are not interfering with, nor are they contrary to, 
the federal program; they are simply a means by which mortgagors who 
have been wronged may seek justice.163 
 
B. Lack of a Private Right of Action in a Federal Statute Should 
Not Equate to Dismissal of State Law Claims 
 
Federal courts have previously allowed state law claims 
implicating federal laws and statutes when the federal statute creates no 
private right of action.164 For example, the Seventh Circuit discussed 
how the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (“FIFRA”) 
does not create a federal cause of action for farmers who are injured 
from these products due to manufacturer violations of the act, but the 
courts have allowed these injured farmers to bring state law claims.165   
In relation to FIFRA, the Supreme Court held that state common law 
claims are not preempted because they are consistent with and do not 
conflict with FIFRA.166 So long as the state law claims do not create or 
add requirements to the federal statute, they should be allowed to move 
forward.167 
Similarly, HOLA is a federal statute that has been enforced 
through state law claims.168 HOLA has no private right of action, but 
this has not prevented the courts from allowing injured parties to bring 
state law claims to enforce its provisions.169 In In re  Ocwen,  the 
Seventh Circuit held that state law claims for breach of contract and 
 
 
161. Id. 
162. Sarapinian, supra note 139, at 921. 
163. See Wigod, 673 F.3d at 576–81 (analyzing and dismissing preemption issues in 
relation to state law claims brought from actions arising under HAMP). 
164. Id. at 581 (citing Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 448 (2005)); 
Sarapinian, supra note 139, at 926 (citing In re Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC Mortg. 
Servicing Litig., 491 F.3d 638, 643 (7th Cir. 2007)). 
165. Wigod, 673 F.3d at 581 (citing Bates, 544 U.S. at 448). 
166. Sarapinian, supra note 139, at 928 (citing Bates, 544 U.S. at 447). 
167. Id. 
168. Id. (citing In re Ocwen Loan Servicing, 491 F.3d at 643). 
169. Id. 
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fraudulent misrepresentation are enforceable in relation to HOLA and 
will complement the federal statute.170 In relation to state law claims 
relating to HOLA, the Seventh Circuit noted that it would be surprising 
if a federal statute or regulatory scheme prevented state law claims for 
violation of state laws.171 
The Wigod court noted that when federal jurisdiction is invoked 
due to diversity of citizenship, the lack of a private cause of action 
should actually be considered as a factor against dismissing the state  
law claims.172 Under the reasoning used in  cases implicating FIRFA  
and HOLA, where neither federal statute created a private cause of 
action, adequately pled state law claims should be permitted even 
though they relate to HAMP.173 
 
C. Precluding State Law Claims Negatively Impacts Mortgagors 
and Favors Deceptive Practices by Mortgage Servicers 
 
HAMP was instituted to slow down foreclosures and assist 
financially distressed homeowners by granting mortgagors a permanent 
modification of the mortgage.174 Regardless of this goal, many eligible 
homeowners who have qualified for HAMP or successfully completed a 
TPP have not received these modifications.175 Some loan servicers have 
used deceptive tactics to avoid granting eligible mortgagors permanent 
modifications.176 In a class action lawsuit, Bank of America employees 
testified that they lied to mortgagors seeking modification, denied 
modification for fictitious reasons, and received rewards for denying 
distressed  mortgagors  modifications.177     Bank  of  America employees 
 
 
170. In re Ocwen Loan Servicing, 491 F.3d at 643–44. 
171. Sarapinian, supra note 139, at 926 (quoting In re Ocwen Loan Servicing, 491 F.3d 
at 643). 
172. Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 673 F.3d 547, 582 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Wyeth 
v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 574 (2009)). 
173. Sarapinian, supra note 139, at 926. 
174. Hawes, supra note 1, at 309. 
175. Id. 
176. Cushla E. Talbut, HAMPered Hope for Homeowners: An Analysis of How 
Litigation Trends Have Exposed the Home Affordable Modification Program’s Weakness, 
68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 295, 296 (2013). 
177. Id. (citing Paul Kiel, Bank of America Lied to Homeowners and Rewarded 
Foreclosures, Former Employees Say, ProPublica (June 2014), 
http://www.propublica.org/article/bank-of-america-lied-to-homeowners-and-rewarded- 
foreclosures). 
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have admitted to engaging in deceptive practices and rejecting qualified 
mortgagors from receiving permanent modification under  HAMP,178 
and similar allegations have been made in many other cases attempting 
to seek redress for actions related to HAMP.179 
To fight their servicers’ deceptive actions and failure to comply 
with servicer obligations under HAMP, some homeowners have turned 
to the courts.180 In Wigod, the Seventh Circuit found that Wigod 
successfully pled all the requirements for a claim for violations of the 
Illinois Consumer Fraud and Protection Act (“ICFA”) and allowed the 
claim to survive a motion to dismiss.181 The specifics of the complaint 
are not detailed in the opinion but Wigod alleged “that Wells Fargo 
dishonestly and ineffectually implemented HAMP.”182 
The Wigod decision represents a victory for mortgagors seeking 
to end deceptive and fraudulent practices by their mortgage servicers 
when it comes to HAMP modifications.183 Unfortunately, some courts 
have found ways to distinguish Wigod.184 These courts have held that  
the contract between the mortgagor and servicer is not complete until 
the permanent modification is signed by the mortgage servicer.185 Other 
courts have distinguished Wigod through differences in the language of 
the TPP agreements.186 In Cave v. Saxon Mortgage Services, Inc.,187 the 
court distinguished the TPP from that in Wigod based on language that 
stated the servicer will determine qualification for a permanent 
modification after completion of the TPP.188 The HAMP Guidelines do 
not require servicers to use specific language in the TPP, but simply 
states “[t]he TPP notice describes the terms and conditions of the trial 
period and  sets  forth the required  payment  due dates.”189     The  courts 
 
178. Id. 
179. See, e.g., Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 673 F.3d 547, 574 (7th Cir. 2012) 
(alleging deceptive and unfair practice by Wells Fargo against Wigod in the handling of her 
HAMP modification); Young v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 717 F.3d 224, 240–42 (1st Cir. 
2013) (claiming Wells Fargo engaged in unfair and deceptive practices). 
180. Hawes, supra note 1, at 309. 
181.    Wigod, 673 F.3d at 574–76. 
182.    Id. at 574. 
183.    Hawes, supra note 1, at 310. 
184.    Id. at 312. 
185. Id. 
186. Id. 
187.    No. 11-4586, 2012 WL 1957588 at *1 (E.D. Pa. May 30, 2012). 
188.    Id. at *4–5. 
189. HAMP HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 126. 
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that have distinguished Wigod are leaving financially distressed 
mortgagors open to potentially deceptive practices by their mortgage 
servicer when seeking a HAMP modification.190 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
Many mortgagors are attempting to bring state law claims 
against their lenders in relation to HAMP modification, more 
specifically through the TPP and other representations made during the 
modification process.191 Although these claims undoubtedly arise from 
actions relating to HAMP, which does not create a private right of 
action, state law claims provide mortgagors a remedy if lenders treat 
mortgagors unfairly in relation to their HAMP duties.192 
Without access to the court system, mortgagors are left with no 
remedy for the actions of their lenders that violate HAMP. It is clear 
from the amount of litigation that mortgagors believe they are being 
treated unfairly, and that their lenders and mortgage servicers do not 
always fully comply with the HAMP mandates. Because courts have 
unanimously held that HAMP creates no private right of action,193 
without the ability to assert state law claims, mortgagors are left at the 
mercy of their lenders. Denying access to the courts keeps the door  
open to the possibility of deceptive practices. 
Furthermore, precluding state law claims will allow lenders and 
mortgage servicers to go unpunished for violating their HAMP 
obligations and engaging in deceptive practices in denying homeowners 
permanent modifications. If mortgagors cannot seek redress under 
HAMP or through state law claims, there is no incentive for the 
mortgage servicers to comply with the HAMP guidelines or dissuade 
them  from  engaging  in  further  deceptive  practices  with  respect  to 
 
 
190. Talbut, supra note 176, at 315. 
191. See, e.g., Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 673 F.3d 547, 560 (7th Cir. 2012) 
(bringing action for breach of contract in relation to TPP and representations made during 
the HAMP modification process); see also Bosque v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 762 F. Supp. 
2d 342, 351 (D. Mass. May 2, 2011) (bringing breach of contract claim in relation to TPP). 
192. See Bosque, 762 F. Supp. 2d at 351 (holding that if the TPP or representations 
made during the HAMP modification process can be seen as a contract, plaintiffs must have 
standing to bring state breach of contract claims). 
193. See, e.g., Miller v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, 677 F.3d 1113, 1117 (11th Cir. 2012) 
(stating HAMP does not create a private right of action); Wigod, 673 F.3d at 555 (stating 
HAMP and its enabling statute do not contain a federal right of action). 
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HAMP modifications. 
Breach of contract and quasi-contract claims, such as  
promissory estoppel, have had the most success at surviving in federal 
courts.194 State law claims alleging fraud and violation of state  
consumer protection laws have also seen some success.195 Many of  
these state law claims are appearing in federal courts based on diversity 
of citizenship and amount in controversy.196 Others are getting into 
federal court through class action and multi-district litigation.197 
The HAMP Guidelines state that mortgagors who successfully 
comply with all the TPP requirements “will be offered a permanent 
modification.”198 It is this mandatory language that mortgagors are 
relying on. Federal courts should follow Wigod and Young, and allow 
adequately pled state law claims to proceed to ensure that mortgage 
servicers are not deceiving mortgagors and are following through with 
their HAMP obligations.199 
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194. See Wigod, 673 F.3d at 566 (allowing alternative claim of promissory estoppel in 
relation to HAMP). 
195. See id. at 559 n.4 (allowing claim for violation the Illinois Consumer Fraud and 
Deceptive Business Practices Act); Young v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 717 F.3d 224, 235 
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